The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 3
Although the Camden Expedition represented a clear Confederate victory, it was a hollow one because the Rebels lost one of their last opportunities to influence the war in their favor. An understanding of the situation in 1864 is critical to evaluating the chance the Confederates in the Trans-Mississippi had in 1864. By the third year of the war the Confederacy’s territory and military powers were receding at an alarming rate. Everywhere in 1863 Rebel armies suffered a series of major defeats. In the east, the Union Army of the Potomac defeated Robert E. Lee’s venerable Army of Northern Virginia driving back the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania at Gettysburg. In the west, the fall of Vicksburg split the Confederacy in two, isolating the eastern states from the Trans-Mississippi and losing the services of 30,000 irreplaceable troops with its surrender. In November at Chattanooga, the stout but hard-luck Army of Tennessee suffered a disheartening defeat while practically surrendering control of the state to the Federal authorities. The new Federal commander-in-chief, Lieutenant General U. S. Grant, intended to maintain the momentum achieved with these victories in order to win the war in 1864.
Upon his accession to command, Grant immediately began to devise a plan to pit Federal strength against the primary Confederate armies. Grant believed that the reason the Confederacy had survived for so long lay in the fact that the Union “armies had acted separately and independently of each other.” As a result, the Rebels had always been able to use their interior lines to shift their forces to deflect the Federal thrusts. “I determined to stop this,” Grant stated. He aimed to correct this flawed approach by launching a simultaneous assault by all Union armies against the Army of Tennessee, Army of Northern Virginia, and the stronghold of Mobile. President Lincoln appreciated the plan and characterized the strategy in his western charm as only he could, exclaiming, “those not skinning can hold a leg.”32
Grant’s plan called for all the Union armies east of the Mississippi to advance on or about April 25, 1864, when roads would be in good condition for campaigning. Major General George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac would move against Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in a pounding overland campaign. In conjunction with Meade’s advance the smaller Army of the James under Major General Benjamin Butler would lunge toward Richmond from a peninsula known as Bermuda Hundred south of the city. Also in Virginia, Franz Sigel’s little army would march up the Shenandoah Valley in order to deprive Lee access to his “breadbasket.”
West of the Appalachians, Major General William T. Sherman’s combined Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio would focus on Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of Tennessee. Finally, Grant wanted Banks to take Mobile, one of the last remaining Confederate ports. Grant explained the plan in his post-war memoirs by stating, “My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field…. Accordingly, I arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line.”33 This brilliant yet simple scheme did not come to fruition as Grant intended, as the wheels were already in motion to derail his plans.
The man Grant succeeded in command of the Union armies was the indecisive Major General Henry Wager Halleck. Known as “Old Brains” in the old army, Halleck conceived the Red River Campaign. The campaign had its genesis in economics, politics, and Halleck’s penchant for clearing his rear area before advancing forward. For some time northeastern textile interests placed pressure on the Lincoln Administration to open up the rich Red River Valley to extract its cotton. The starved textile mills of the north sought to alleviate their shortages by obtaining the commodity in Louisiana and east Texas.34
From a political perspective, the administration had three reasons for pursuing a campaign in the Trans-Mississippi. First, a large German population—known to be hostile to the Confederacy—farmed “Free-Soil” cotton plantations in east Texas. Northern politicians had clamored for some time to “free” these German-American citizens from the Rebel grip. Many German immigrants served in the Union armies and they felt a vested interest in helping their countrymen and the administration was inclined to listen to their pleas. Second, France had recently placed a puppet emperor on the throne in Mexico in violation of the long-standing Monroe Doctrine. This European infringement of affairs in the Western Hemisphere angered Lincoln and he and his advisors felt obliged to respond to French intransigence. Finally, with the national election looming in 1864 Lincoln hoped to readmit federally occupied southern states to the Union for the purpose of allowing loyal citizens to participate in the plebiscite. This, many Republicans believed, would deliver votes to their ticket in November enabling Lincoln to secure victory.35
As early as August 1863 General Halleck began suggesting to General Banks that “a combined military and naval movement up the Red River” would be desired. The purpose was to “restore the flag to some one point in Texas.” Halleck’s plan suggested36 that Banks, reinforced by troops from Sherman, ascend the Red with about 30,000 men. In “cooperation” Admiral David D. Porter would sweep the river proper with a large naval contingent providing the army with logistical and fire support. Finally, Halleck wrote to General Steele stating, “[I]t is hoped that … concerted [action] between yourself and General Sherman and General Banks to drive the enemy entirely out of Arkansas and occupy the line of Red River” will occur.37 Banks’ column would constitute the main effort while Steele’s would serve as a secondary thrust to deceive the Rebels about the intention of the campaign. As already pointed out, this plan ran counter to Grant’s intent for the 1864 campaign season. Grant, against his better judgment, allowed the campaign to proceed out of deference to Halleck and because Banks’ men were already en route to their jump-off positions.38
General Steele began to have doubts about his capability to support Banks with a move southward from Little Rock. As a result, he expressed his reservations in correspondence with Halleck by tactfully attempting to avoid a full-scale expedition through southern Arkansas to the Red.
General Banks, with 17,000 and 10,000 of Sherman’s, will be at Alexandria on the 17th [of March] instant. This is more than equal for anything Kirby Smith can bring against him. Smith will run. By holding the line of Arkansas secure I can soon free this state from armed rebels. Sherman insists upon my moving upon Shreveport to co-operate with the above-mentioned forces with all my effective force. I have prepared to do so, against my own judgment…. The roads are most if not quite impracticable; the country is destitute of provisions on the route…. I made a proposition to General Banks to threaten the enemy’s flank and rear with all my cavalry, and to make a feint with infantry on the Washington road.39
Steele wrapped up the dispatch by requesting permission to execute the cavalry raid and infantry feint. “I advise that you proceed to co-operate in the movement of Banks and Sherman on Shreveport, unless General Grant orders differently,” Halleck responded, now acting as Grant’s chief of staff. Halleck immediately forwarded the letter to Grant for his decision on Steele’s proposal. Grant, having assumed command of the Union armies only days before, immediately realized the importance of Steele moving with his full force rather than a feint. Accordingly, he sent out a dispatch to Steele stating, “[M]ove your force in full co-operation with General N. P. Banks…. A mere demonstration will not be sufficient.”40
Grant intuitively understood that Steele’s movement would confuse the Confederate high command. Additionally, he wanted the Red River campaign wrapped up as soon as possible because he wanted the movement on Mobile to coincide with the movement of all other armies. He believed that Banks could take Shreveport by mid-April and then turn back to the Gulf to prepare to take Mobile by the end of the month. When Banks and Steele joined forces on the Red, Steele would assume command of that region while Banks would move east in accordance with Grant’s program for the spring.41
Banks’ bumbling put Grant’s grand scheme in jeopardy. However, Grant’s prescient decision to order Steele forward saved Banks from disaster and ultimately the entire Union wa
r effort. Because Grant ordered Steele to conduct a full-scale campaign in Arkansas, it forced the Rebels to defend against two major threats to the Trans-Mississippi Department rather than one. Had Grant accepted Steele’s argument “to make a feint” the Confederates would—with reasonable certainty—have destroyed Banks’ army and Porter’s fleet in the Red River Valley.42
Had Taylor retained the troops that Smith took to Arkansas he could have precipitated a disaster on Union arms. He had three distinct opportunities to do so with an appropriate force. When Kirby Smith left with three of Taylor’s divisions the possibilities evaporated. The Army of the Gulf instead of heading off to prison camps, escaped back to their starting point. Grant then ordered these veterans to the main Federal armies in the East to participate, albeit belatedly, in the campaigns he planned for late April. An analysis of the impact the individual units had east of the Mississippi reveals the great contributions they made to the final outcome of the war. Without these veterans, the war with reasonable probability could have ended much differently.
By mid-June 1864 all the Federal offensives had stalled. In the east, the Army of the Potomac had suffered more than 50,000 casualties in its campaign against the Army of Northern Virginia. In spite of the bloodletting, Robert E. Lee had confounded the Federals at every turn. Not satisfied to remain on the defensive, Lee launched his 2nd Corps under Lieutenant General Jubal Early on a foray down the Shenandoah Valley in early June. Lee’s purpose was to clear remaining Federals from the Valley to secure its fertile farms as a source of sustenance for his army. Also, he wanted to relieve pressure on the Army of Northern Virginia now holed up on a defensive belt covering Richmond and Petersburg. The opportunistic Early not only cleared the Valley in an aggressive drive, but he kept right on going across the Potomac into Maryland. After brushing aside a scratch force on the Monocacy, Early marched to the very gates of Washington panicking the Lincoln Administration.43
The government now demanded that Grant respond to this threat by sending troops to bolster the depleted Washington defenses. Grant dispatched the VI Corps from the Army of the Potomac and directed the XIX Corps arriving from New Orleans after taking part in the Red River Campaign. The XIX Corps helped save the capital and went on to play a prominent role in driving the Confederates out of the Shenandoah. In October, the XIX Corps proved pivotal to defeating and practically destroying Early’s army at Cedar Creek.44 The battle of Cedar Creek permanently closed off the Valley from Confederate control. Had the XIX Corps been captured or destroyed in Louisiana, Cedar Creek in all likelihood would not have happened.
In the west, Sherman’s army found itself frustrated in its drive to Atlanta. The wily Joseph Johnston proved a master of defensive warfare always keeping one step ahead of his foe. Of greater concern, in Sherman’s opinion, were the operations of the elusive Rebel general Nathan Bedford Forrest. “I was disturbed by a bold raid made by the rebel General Forrest,” Sherman stated in his memoirs. Forrest spent his spring raiding through west Tennessee and was threatening to cut Sherman’s tenuous supply line between Nashville and Chattanooga. Should Forrest enjoy success in this endeavor, Sherman feared he would have to abandon the Atlanta campaign. With this in mind he pressured Banks to return the 10,000 troops of the XVI and XVII Corps on loan for the Red River Campaign.45
Upon A. J. Smith’s arrival at Memphis from the Red River Valley, Sherman dispatched him to keep Forrest busy and “off our roads”—the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad. Smith, a tenacious fighter, did this in superb fashion by occupying all of Forrest’s attention and fighting him to a draw at Tupelo in mid-July. Meanwhile, Sherman kept the pressure on Johnston by constantly forcing him back toward Atlanta. Smith’s efforts against Forrest made Sherman’s eventual capture of Atlanta in September possible.46 However, if Sherman’s veterans had been captured in Louisiana, where would Sherman have found the troops to occupy Forrest? The absence of these men could have caused a disheartening setback in the Atlanta campaign for Federal arms.
The XIII Corps formed the nucleus of the force that would finally make Grant’s desired move to close Mobile. In August a combined army and naval force stormed the harbor forts and land face protecting the city. It was this battle that brought Admiral David G. Farragut lasting fame with his well-known quote, “Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead.” The XIII Corps stormed and took the fortifications protecting the mouth of the bay in support of the naval force.47 Once again the question arises: Where would the Federals have scraped together enough troops to take Mobile if the Rebels had destroyed the XIII Corps in the Red River Valley?
Finally, the loss of the Army of the Gulf in Louisiana would have translated into the destruction or capture of a large chunk of Admiral Porter’s Mississippi River Squadron. Low water in the Red had trapped the gunboats above the rapids at Alexandria. Therefore, without protection from the army the precious fleet would have been lost.48 Infinite possibilities were available to the Rebels if they could have gotten their hands on a few good boats. At best they might have challenged Federal dominance of the Mississippi or at the very least the Confederates could have reopened communications with their brethren east of the Mississippi. This would have nullified the results of the great victory at Vicksburg the year before.
The key to success for the Union cause in 1864 lay in the minds of the Northern public because this was an election year. At the beginning of the year victory in the war effort appeared bright indeed. However, the combination of the stalled offensives in the east and west, high casualties, and near disaster in the Red River Valley sent morale reeling. In order to ensure the restoration of the Union, the Lincoln Administration needed victories on the battlefield to win at the polls in November.49
The Confederate strategy then should have focused on frustrating the Union war effort. If they could have made it appear that they could not be defeated in the near future by force of arms, the Rebels just might have achieved their goal of independence. As Shelby Foote points out, the Confederates simply had to hold the southern heartland by avoiding a large-scale defeat while launching limited offensives. “The object was to make each gain so costly in blood and tears that the expense would be clearly disproportionate to the profit,” offers Foote. If by the second week of November, the Union appeared no closer to victory than they had been at the beginning of the year, the Lincoln Administration would have lost.50
The Red River Campaign offered the Confederates an unprecedented opportunity to exercise the winning strategy. Although the Rebels did enjoy success it did not achieve what it could have. A big reason for this is because the Camden Expedition perplexed Kirby Smith in Louisiana. His focus on defending the territorial integrity of the Trans-Mississippi rather than destroying the enemy resulted in his failure to reap the fortunes of the opportunity offered to him. The Fabian defensive policy merely fit neatly with Confederate war policy and with Smith’s perceived need to maintain control of every inch of the region.51
In a twist of irony the little known Camden Expedition saved the large body of troops and naval forces in the Red River Valley for service on other fields. General Steele had attempted to avoid even making the effort. But, Grant’s direct order to Steele forced him to support Banks. Had Grant not issued this order Banks would most certainly have lost his army and Porter the naval contingent. These troops went on to play important roles in the great campaigns in the east later in the year guaranteeing that Lincoln would win and the Union would survive. Although unknown to the men who took part in the Camden Expedition, their efforts helped save an army and thus contributed significantly to the success of the cause for which they fought.
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Notes
1. This account is the acclaimed historian Edwin C. Bearss’ book titled Steele’s Retreat from Camden.
2. Ludwell Johnson, Red River Campaign, 278; Bearss, Steele’s Retreat from Camden, 178; War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Vol. 34, Part 1, 680, 684, 692, 712, 714, 746
, 767, 786–788 and Part 3, 147 (hereafter cited as OR); Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, “Opposing Forces in Arkansas,” 368 (hereafter cited as B&L); Ira D. Richard, “Jenkins’ Ferry,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly (Spring 1961), 3–16 (hereafter cited as AHQ); Charles H. Lothrop, History of the 1st Iowa Cavalry, 158–159.
3. Report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, Second Session 38th Congress, XVIII, emphasis in original (hereafter cited as Report of the Joint Committee).
4. Ibid., XVIII–XXVI.; OR, Part 1, Vol. 34, 683, 807; Johnson, Red River Campaign, 40.
5. Ibid., 384.
6. Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol. 3, 29.
7. David D. Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, 520; ORN, Vol. 27, Part 1, 64. Letter from Banks to Navy Lt. Commander Thomas O. Selfridge. In this letter Banks discusses his difficulty in communicating with Steele and his belief that Steele “fails to cooperate” while unknown to him Steele had been campaigning for some three weeks.
8. Report of the Joint Committee, XXV.
9. Ibid., 383–385.
10. John G. Walker, “War West of the Mississippi in the Years 1863-4 & 5,” unpublished manuscript Myron Gwinner Collection, United States Army Military History Institute, 45.
11. Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 190–192 and Report of the Joint Committee, 58–61.
12. Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 194–198.
13. Report of the Joint Committee, 13, 77, 195–196 and 326–327.
14. Robert L. Kerby, Kirby Smith’s Confederacy, 246–248.
15. Ibid.; and Jeffrey S. Prushankin, “A Crisis in Command,” M.A. thesis, Malvey Library, Villanova University, 40–41; Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West, 173.