The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 4
16. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 516–517; and B&L, “The Defense of the Red River,” by E. K. Smith, Vol. IV, 370.
17. Ibid.; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 526.
18. Ibid., 514.
19. B&L, “The Defense of the Red River,” by E. K. Smith, 372; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 207.
20. B&L, “The Defense of the Red River,” by E. K. Smith, 372–372; J. E. Sliger, “How General Taylor Fought the Battle of Mansfield, La.,” Confederate Veteran (December 1923), 458; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 207–208.
21. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 571–572; and Johnson, Red River Campaign, 182.
22. Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 224; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 570.
23. Andrew F. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa Infantry Volunteer Regiment, 71.
24. Ira D. Richards, “Camden Expedition,” University of Arkansas M.A. thesis, 11–12.
25. Christopher R. Gabel, Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War Strategy, 1–5.
26. Anne J. Bailey and Daniel Sutherland eds., Civil War Arkansas, 64, 102, 119, 140, 196, & 214; Michael Dougan, “Life in Confederate Arkansas,” AHQ, Vol. 34 (Spring 1972), 16–18; and Henry Cathey, “Extracts from the Memoirs of William Franklin Avera,” AHQ, Vol. 22 (Winter 1963), 101–105.
27. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 661, 675–676; and Johnson, Red River Campaign, 178–179.
28. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 661–663; and Part 3, 162, 267–268.
29. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 541–543; and a post-war description in Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 223–224.
30. Prushankin, “A Crisis in Command,” M.A. thesis, 29, 96–102; Castel, Sterling Price, 173; OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 476. In an April 16, 1864, letter to Jefferson Davis, Smith states, “of the three district commanders Major-Generals Magruder, Price, and Taylor, the latter is the junior and the only one of the three I consider suited to take charge of affairs of the department”; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 224–225; and Johnson, Red River Campaign, 177.
31. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 530–531.
32. U. S. Grant, Memoirs, 127; T. Harry Williams, ed., Military Analysis of the Civil War, “Military Strategy of the Civil War,” U. S. Grant III, 9–10; and Foote, The Civil War, Vol. 3, 13–23.
33. Grant, Memoirs, 128–132; and T. Harry Williams, ed., Military Analysis of the Civil War, “Military Strategy of the Civil War,” by U. S. Grant III, 13–14.
34. Johnson, Red River Campaign, 17, 36, 41–44 & 47–48; and Foote, The Civil War, 15–16.
35. Johnson, Red River Campaign, 6–11 & 45–48; Report of the Joint Committee, IV–V; and John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, 266–280 &285–286.
36. General Halleck had a habit of not issuing orders, but rather offering up courses of action he expected commanders to use. When they did not do as he suggested he would berate them as if he had issued actual orders.
37. Report of the Joint Committee, XXXI–XXXII [emphasis in original], 156–157.
38. Grant, Memoirs, Vol. II, 139.
39. Report of the Joint Committee, 338–339.
40. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 616.
41. Report of the Joint Committee, 159, 383–385; Grant, Memoirs, Vol. 2, 134–140; William T. Sherman, Personal Memoirs, Vol. 2, 26–17; and Johnson, Red River Campaign, 85, 105–106.
42. Michael Forsyth, The Red River Campaign of 1864 and the Loss by the Confederacy of the Civil War, 1–5.
43. Frank Vandiver, Jubal’s Raid, 18–19, 25–26; Long, The Jewel of Liberty, 207–208; and Foote, The Civil War, Vol. 3, 446–461.
44. Ibid.; Long, The Jewel of Liberty, 210; and Jeffrey Wert, From Winchester to Cedar Creek, 230–233.
45. Sherman, Memoirs, 12–14; and Foote, The Civil War, Vol. 3, 357–358.
46. Sherman, Memoirs, 52; Castel, Decision in the West, 277; Long, The Jewel of Liberty, 206–207; and David G. Wills, A Battle from the Start, 216–217.
47. Chester G. Hearn, Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign, 125–137; B&L, “Land Operations Against Mobile,” by Richard Irwin, Vol. IV, 400, 410–411 and “Farragut at Mobile Bay,” by John C. Kinney, 391; and Long, The Jewel of Liberty, 209.
48. Report of the Joint Committee, 244–245; Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Vol. 27, Part 1, 68–70 (hereafter cited as ORN); Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, 523–527; and Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Vol. II, 26.
49. Long, The Jewel of Liberty, 195 and 198–199.
50. Foote, The Civil War, Vol. 3, 102–103.
51. Williams, ed., Military Analysis of the Civil War, article by U. S. Grant III, “Military Strategy of the Civil War,” 13.
2
The Rebel Commanders
To gain a full understanding of the decisions and events that occurred during the Camden Expedition requires a thorough examination of the character of the opposing command teams. The individual background and personality of each man reveals volumes about the outcome of both the Red River Campaign and the Camden Expedition. In addition, the manner by which these men interacted presents an intriguing study of the dynamics of combat command. The Rebel commanders came from diverse paths to fight on the fields of Arkansas and Louisiana. The contrasts and similarities make for an interesting story and enhance the historiography of the expedition.
General Edmund Kirby Smith held overall command of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department and had responsibility for defense of its vast territory. All decisions pertaining to her defense rested on his shoulders. Smith came from a distinguished yet modest family. The Kirbys and Smiths contributed sons who fought in the war for American independence and Smith’s father Joseph served with some distinction in the War of 1812. Dissatisfaction over long separations from his family convinced Joseph to leave the army in 1821. Political connections enabled him to secure a federal judgeship in the newly formed Florida territory. Joseph soon moved with his family to the old city of St. Augustine.1
Early in his young life, Kirby Smith’s parents recognized potential in him and made plans to provide him with an excellent education. In the 19th century a West Point education opened doors to further advancement, therefore Joseph and Frances Smith steered him in this direction. “Ned,” as his parents affectionately called him, came under the tutelage of his older sister. Twelve years his senior, Frances2 proved instrumental to the success in preparing Smith for an academy appointment. Through his early years in St. Augustine Frances assumed motherly responsibility for him, ensuring he attended to his studies. Smith had a somewhat mischievous streak exhibited by his tendency to play hooky. In spite of this Ned won admittance to the prestigious Hallowell school in Alexandria, Virginia. The school’s rigid standards provided the discipline young Smith needed to pass the tough West Point entrance exams.3
At age 17 Smith easily met the requirements for admittance to the academy and accepted appointment in 1841. He got off to a fast start at West Point standing fifth in his class after his plebe year. Despite his high achievement in academic pursuits Smith chafed under the pettiness of the voluminous regulations. In a letter to his father he complained about the assessment of demerits “for a button off a coat, or because of his clothes, bed, windows, room, mantle, shelves, books, hands, or nails out of order.” As a result of his disdain, Smith’s class standing would drop to 25th in his class upon commissioning in 1845.4
Kirby Smith chose to accept an infantry commission and received orders assigning him to the 5th Infantry Regiment posted at Fort Jesup, Louisiana. Ironically, this area would someday fall under his responsibility as Rebel commander of the Trans-Mississippi and sit directly in the path of the opposing armies in 1864. In a further twist of irony, Smith’s commanding officer in the 5th Infantry was Colonel Zachary Taylor, future president of the United States and father of one of his two primary subordinates during Camden and the Red River Campaign.5
Smith had little time to settle into his new assignment, for war with Mexico lo
omed on the horizon. Within weeks of his arrival Taylor, under orders from the War Department, deployed the regiment to the border with Mexico. Soon Taylor and his small army would see combat against the Mexican forces. Smith earned recognition from his commander for his courage in the battles of Resaca de la Palma and Cerro Gordo. Smith’s company captured an enemy cannon and his performance under fire would bring him advancement in rank by brevet to first lieutenant.6
After the war Smith served as a professor of mathematics at West Point. This represented a turning point in his life as he decided to make military service his career. “I have chosen the army,” he wrote to his mother, “or rather the army has been selected for me as a profession, and I see no prospect of its ever being changed … I am proud of it.”7 Smith therefore dedicated his life to the service, a characteristic that would manifest itself throughout the Civil War. He would unswervingly serve the cause and made decisions based on what he believed was the correct course of action.
After three years at West Point Smith joined the 7th Infantry Regiment guarding the western frontier against Indian incursions. He continued to perform in a competent manner over the next few years earning a promotion to captain and assignment to the new and elite 2nd Cavalry Regiment. Only officers considered a notch above the rest served in the regiment. The unit included such future Civil War leaders as Robert E. Lee, Albert S. Johnston, George Thomas, John Bell Hood, and Earl Van Dorn.8 It was about 1855 when the question of secession began to generate discourse among the officer corps.
Smith, like many Southerners, was wary of such talk of dissolution of the Union. He believed the best interests of the South lay with remaining in the Union and finding a way to compromise over the explosive issues. Nevertheless, “right or wrong I go with the land of my birth,” Smith told his mother. The test of his allegiance came soon after writing that letter as Florida seceded from the Union. With his native state joining the states of the lower south in secession, Smith painfully sent his resignation to the War Department and offered his sword to the South in March 1861. The new Confederate government was eager to have the services of officers of reputation and offered Smith a commission as colonel. Upon acceptance in April Smith received orders to proceed to Virginia to begin organizing recruits then arriving in droves at camps in Lynchburg.9
Within a month Smith would assume command of a brigade in General Joseph E. Johnston’s army in the Shenandoah Valley. Smith’s brigade reported for duty guarding the approaches south into Virginia at Harper’s Ferry. After two months of uneventful service, General P. G. T. Beauregard sent a desperate request for reinforcement to Johnston’s Valley Army. A large Federal force had moved south from Washington threatening to turn the Confederate defenses along Bull Run Creek near Manassas Junction. Johnston responded by placing his small army on rail cars en route to Manassas, including the brigade of newly promoted Brigadier General E. Kirby Smith’s. Smith became one of the South’s early heroes as a result of his actions at the Battle of First Bull Run. At a point in the battle when the Confederates appeared defeated Smith’s brigade arrived just in time to swing the tide in favor of the Rebels. Upon arrival at Manassas Junction, Smith quickly disembarked his men and marched them at the double-quick to the sounds of a desperate battle. The hard-pressed Rebel left held and then counterattacked sending the raw Union recruits in a headlong retreat back toward Washington. While winning the sobriquet “Blucher of Manassas,” Smith fell with a Minié ball through his thigh. Smith’s actions won him accolades across the South and further promotion to major general and division command.10
Smith would spend most of the remainder of 1861 recovering from his painful wound finally returning to duty in November. He had just settled into his new command when the War Department summoned him to take command of the volatile Department of East Tennessee. This new assignment did not please him because his command was an area teeming with Unionist sentiment. Nevertheless, Smith accepted the challenge and took up his duties determined to make a positive impression on the citizens of the region while instilling discipline in the military units. Service in east Tennessee would prove an excellent training ground for future command of the Trans-Mississippi Department. Frustration became status quo for Smith as he struggled to stifle Unionist activities. In spite of the headaches, he systematically instituted a plan to gain control for Confederate authorities while building his meager troops into a force capable of offensive operations. Part of his program called for initiating martial law and exchanging troops of questionable loyalty with soldiers from other areas of the Confederacy.11 This established a foundation that enabled Smith to turn his attention to other fields.
In mid-summer of 1862, Smith cast his gaze toward Kentucky and the “liberation” of that state from Federal control. In July he developed a plan to drive north into Kentucky in order to clear Tennessee of Federal forces and allow the state to recover from the destruction wrought by the war. Smith opened up a dialogue with General Braxton Bragg in Mississippi to propose that they cooperate in the movement north. Bragg was amenable to Smith’s suggestions as he had been considering similar operations himself. Both believed that transferring the seat of war to the Ohio Valley would relieve the ailing Confederate heartland of pressure, recover middle Tennessee, and possibly contribute to winning foreign recognition for the Confederacy. After a July 31 conference in Chattanooga, Bragg made arrangements to transfer his army from Mississippi to Chattanooga for the invasion.12
Smith led the foray, jumping off on August 14, 1862. At first the effort appeared destined for success as Smith moved rapidly over vast distances gobbling up Federal garrisons and pushing Union forces before him. At Richmond, Kentucky, his 18,000 men fought and won a tough battle bagging over 4,000 prisoners and nine pieces of artillery. Shortly, Smith had his army back on the road and soon occupied Lexington and the state capital at Frankfort. As Bragg’s newly designated Army of Tennessee moved into central Kentucky, Smith sent him an enthusiastic letter recommending combination of their forces in the vicinity of Lexington. Unfortunately, the cordial cooperation between the two Rebel commanders would soon fade.13
The Confederacy formed commands based on territorial regions rather than enemy-oriented organizations. Time and again during the war Rebel armies failed to achieve decisive results, or worse, they met with defeat because of this flawed organizational structure.14 This factor is behind the failed Bragg-Smith Kentucky Campaign. Because the Confederate War Department did not establish a unified command between Smith’s Department of East Tennessee and Bragg’s Department of Tennessee cracks in their cooperation formed soon after Bragg entered central Kentucky. Smith and Bragg moved into Kentucky with diverging objectives, lack of unity, and with ambition driving each man. When Bragg fought the indecisive Battle of Perryville squandering its opportunities, the invasion ended in ignominious failure. Smith bitterly criticized Bragg for his role in the campaign while exonerating himself and the decisions he made. The Kentucky Campaign was a precursor of events that would occur in the Trans-Mississippi later in the war.15
Following the debacle, Secretary of War George Randolph informed Kirby Smith that he had been promoted to lieutenant general. However, with promotion would come a new challenge. President Jefferson Davis summoned him to Richmond in January 1863 to discuss whether Smith might accept command of the Trans-Mississippi Department. Davis needed an energetic commander for a region that suffered under the uninspired leadership of Theophilus Holmes, poor transportation, few troops, and apathy. Though East Tennessee had supplied Smith with daily headaches, problems west of the Mississippi would dwarf anything yet seen. Smith did not necessarily want a command so far from the center of the war, but accepted out of patriotism and gratitude for the confidence shown him. Votes of approval for Davis’ choice to command the department came from many quarters, but none were more important then Robert E. Lee’s endorsement stating that he “consider[ed] him one of our best officers.”16
Conditions in the region appalled Smi
th. During a tour of his new command he found “no soldiers, no arms or ammunition, and no money within the limits of the district.” Further, Confederate national policy dictated that the department must become self-sufficient. With no help expected from the government, Smith set about improving conditions with his meager resources.17 Any contributions to a Confederate victory would be of his own efforts and required effecting a solid command relationship with his headstrong and difficult subordinates. One of these men was a bear of a man named Sterling Price.
Major General Sterling Price commanded the Trans-Mississippi Department’s District of Arkansas. He descended from a long line of Virginians who arrived at Jamestown in 1622. The Price family story is one of Welsh immigrants struggling to rise above the obscurity of itinerate farmers into the gentile and closed planter’s society. The legacy of Sterling’s forefathers’ struggle to attain respectability would weigh heavily upon him and play a prominent role in defining his character. Sterling Price was born in 1809 in Prince Edward County, Virginia. Sterling’s parents were of modest means holding a small farm with a comfortable home overlooking the Buffalo River. His father, Pugh, was a small slaveholder and first sergeant of the local militia company. He was a regular at all social functions in the area and everything he did was calculated to elevate him to the social position he craved.18
In 1812 Sterling’s father and older brother left home to fight in the war against England. Young Sterling would have little recollection of this, but would fondly remember his youth growing up in tidewater Virginia. Frolicking on his father’s tobacco farm would occupy his early childhood. Tobacco proved a boon to the Prices as the price of the leaf shot up to record levels in the years prior to 1820. This provided the opportunity to acquire more land to grow the family spread, an essential element to attaining gentleman planter status.19 However, by the 1820s tobacco bottomed out and the opportunity to purchase more land in Virginia dried up as well. Since land acquisition was key to social advancement, the land depression guaranteed that Pugh Price could not rise above his status as a modest freeholder. Sterling absorbed all the lessons of operating the plantation as well as noting what it took to move up the social ladder from his father.